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INTRODUCTION

On March 27, 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA" or "the Act") 1 into law. The
culmination of a protracted six-year legislative and political struggle,
BCRA is the most significant change in federal campaign finance law since
the early 1970s, when the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") of
1971 and FECA Amendments of 1974 were adopted. The Act addresses a
broad range of campaign finance issues, including fundraising on federal
property, 2 contributions by foreign nationals, 3 donations to the presidential
inauguration committee,4 electronic filing and Internet access to campaign
disclosure reports, 5 and penalties for the violation of federal campaign
finance restrictions and requirements. 6 But the heart of the Act consists of
new and more restrictive regulations of the two phenomena that have
dominated the campaign finance debate for more than a decade-soft
money and issue advocacy. 7 As of the day after the November 2002
general election, the Act sharply curbs the ability of state parties to use soft
money in federal elections and completely bars the national parties from
using soft money. 8 The Act also expands FECA's disclosure requirements
and prohibitions on corporate and union expenditures to include most "issue
advocacy" in the pre-election period. 9
Even before the ink on President Bush's signature was dry, however, the
first of nearly a dozen lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the new
law were filed. 10 The plaintiffs-including the Republican National
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002)
1.
(to be codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and
47 U.S.C.).
Id. § 302 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 607(a)).
2.
Id. § 303 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)).
3.
4.
Id. § 308 (to be codified at 36 U.S.C § 510).
Id. § 501 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1 1)(B)).
5.
Id. § 312 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A)).
6.
Id. §§ 102 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)), 201 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §
7.
434), 203 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)-441c), 204 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §
441b).
Id. § 101 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C §§ 441i, 431(20)-(24)).
8.
Id. §§ 201 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434), 203 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §
9.
441b(b)(2)-441c), 204 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
10. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, NRA v. FEC, No. 02-0581
(D.D.C. March 27, 2002), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/campaignfmance
/nra-complaint-32702.pdf (last visited Dec. 4 2002).
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Committee, the California Democratic Party, the AFL-CIO, the American
Civil Liberties Union, the National Rifle Association, the National
Association of Broadcasters, the National Association of Manufacturers,
and numerous members of Congress-constitute a veritable who's who of
American politics." With a three-judge court likely to rule on these
challenges in early 2003,12 it is not clear whether the soft money and issue
advocacy restrictions will ever be applied in the context of a federal
election.
Nor is constitutional litigation the only hurdle the new law must
surmount. In July 2002, the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") adopted
a controversial set of rules implementing BCRA's soft money provisions.13
Many observers contend the rules gut key portions of the Act and facilitate
the continuation of the soft money system. 14 BCRA's principal sponsors
are currently considering both 5 litigation and a legislative challenge to
overturn the FEC's regulations.'
Even if BCRA survives the courts and the FEC, it is only a partial step
toward real campaign finance reform. BCRA essentially plugs many of the
gaps that emerged in FECA's structure over time, as the FEC and court
decisions eroded FECA's provisions, and politicians, interest groups, and
donors developed new ways of raising and spending campaign money
outside of FECA. By bringing soft money and issue advocacy under
regulation, BCRA restores the status quo ante of campaign finance
regulation as of the 1980s. This is an important step forward. Certainly, the
evasions and fine legal distinctions that gave rise to soft money and issue
advocacy made a mockery of campaign finance law, and had a broader
demoralizing effect on belief in the very possibility of effective campaign
finance regulation. Yet, despite its many achievements, BCRA fails to
address some of the fundamental issues of our campaign finance systemthe need for funding that will enable candidates to mount effective,
competitive races without undue dependence on wealthy, private donors,
11. See Motion to Consolidate, McConnell v. FEC, No. 2-CV-582 (D.D.C. May 7, 2002),
available at http://www.camlc.org/attachment.htm/Motion+for+Consolidation+5-7-02.pd~id
=20 (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) (noting prior consolidation of seven challenges to BCRA in
motion to consolidate an eighth case).
12. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Notice of Orders or
Judgments, July 26, 2002, available at http://www.camlc.org/attachment.html/Court+order+july
26.pdfid=61 (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
13. Federal Election Commission, Prohibited and Excessive Contributions: Non-Federal
Funds or Soft Money, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,064 (July 29, 2002).
14. See, e.g., Election Law Coup d'Etat,N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2002, at A18; Stop Opening
Loopholes, WASH. POST, June 22, 2002, at A18.
15. Election-Campaign Finance, Sponsors of Election Reform Law Plan Action to
Overturn FECRule, 71 U.S.L.W. 2010 (July 2, 2002).
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and the need for an effective mechanism for enforcing our campaign
finance laws.
This article considers the future of campaign finance reform in the
immediate aftermath of BCRA. Part II considers the constitutional issues
posed by the Act's soft money and issue advocacy restrictions. Part III
discusses the FEC's new rules and their implications for BCRA. Part IV
considers the next items on the reform agenda if BCRA's soft money and
issue advocacy limits are sustained-public funding for candidates and
reform (or replacement) of the FEC.
II.

BCRA's SOFT MONEY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY PROVISIONS AND THE
CONSTITUTION

A.

Background: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy

The term "soft money" refers to the use of money outside the scope of
federal campaign finance law-and therefore not subject to FECA's16
contribution limitations and source prohibitions-in federal elections.
This can occur when the money is spent on activities that benefit a federal
candidate, but not as a contribution to, coordinated activity with, or express
advocacy concerning that candidate. The principal means of providing such
indirect-and thus, unregulated-aid to federal candidates has involved
state political parties and state elections.' 7 FECA regulates only federal
elections, but federal and state elections often occur concurrently, with
candidates for federal and state offices appearing on one ballot. Party
committees undertake campaign efforts-including party administrative
expenses, voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives, and generic party
activities-that simultaneously assist both their federal and state candidates.
Although spending on federal candidates must satisfy FECA's disclosure
rules, dollar limitations and source prohibitions-such as the bans on
contributions by business corporations, unions, and government
8
contractors-aid to state candidates is beyond FECA's scope.'
In the late 1970s, the FEC determined that national and state party
committees could use funds that do not comply with FECA to defray the so16. See generally Richard Briffault, The PoliticalParties and Campaign Finance Reform,
100 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 628-31 (2000).
17. See The Center for Public Integrity, State Secrets: A Joint Investigation of Political
Party Money in the States, at http://www.publicintegrity.org (June 25, 2002) (on file with
author).
18. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(2) (2000).
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called "nonfederal" portion of party expenses that benefit both federal and
state candidates. 19 Initially a minor factor in federal elections, such
nonfederal, or "soft," money grew rapidly in the 1990s. In the 1999-2000
election cycle, soft money receipts for the two major parties reached $495
million, and soft money accounted for 40% of political party fundraising,
and nearly 50% of the funds received by the Democratic Party. Much of
this money consists of very large donations from business corporations and
labor unions-which are prohibited by federal law from using treasury
funds to make contributions or expenditures in connection with federal
campaigns2 '-and of donations from individuals far in excess of FECA's
individual contribution limits. 22
In the 1999-2000 election cycle,
approximately $300 million in soft money (or 60% of the total) came from
just 800 donors.2 3 The average donation in this group of top donors was,
thus, approximately $375,000.
The rapid growth of soft money in recent years was strongly influenced
by the other major campaign finance development-the rise of issue
advocacy advertising. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld
FECA's disclosure provision. 24 In so doing, it considered the scope of the
law's disclosure requirement. The statute imposes reporting and disclosure
rules for any person who makes a contribution or expenditure above a
threshold amount "for the purpose of influencing" any election for federal
office. 25 The Court noted that, when applied to someone other than a
candidate or a political committee, the statutory language has the "potential
for encompassing both issue discussion[s] and advocacy of a political
result., 26
Although application of the statute to contributions and
19. See FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10 (1978), available at http://hemdon3.sdrdc.com/ao
/ao/780010.html (last visited Jan 7, 2003); FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17 (1979), available at
http://hemdon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/790017.html (last visited Jan 7, 2003); Richard Briffault, The
PoliticalParties and CampaignFinanceReform, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 628-31 (2000).
20. Federal Election Commission, FEC Reports Increase in Party Fundraisingfor 2000,
(May 15, 2001), at http://www.fec.gov/press/O51501partyfund/O51501partyfund.html (last
visited Dec. 4, 2002). In 1999-2000 soft money accounted for $495 million out of total national
party receipts of $1.236 billion, and for $245 million out of total national Democratic party
receipts of $520 million. See id.
21. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000).
22. Id. § 441 a(a)(1)(A) (limiting individual donations to $1000 per candidate per election,
with primary and general elections treated as separate elections); § 441a(a)(1)(B) (limiting
individual contribution to national political party for federal election purposes to $20,000 per
calendar year).
23. See CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LuKE P. McLOUGHLIN, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION
ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTION 78 (Brennan Ctr. for Justice) (2001).

24.
25.
26.

424 U.S. 1,61 (1976).
Id.
Id. at 79.
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expenditures by candidates, their committees, and "organizations . . . the
major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate" did not
pose a problem, the statute's language raised questions of unconstitutional
27
vagueness and overbreadth if applied to other persons and organizations.
As a result, the Court limited the disclosure requirement "to reach only
funds used for communications that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 28 Such expenditures are now
known in campaign finance jargon as "express advocacy"; all other political
communications are called "issue advocacy," although many so-called
"issue ads" do not discuss issues at all. 29 The express advocacy/issue
advocacy distinction has come to map the constitutional scope of campaign
finance regulation, including the ban on corporate and union contributions
and expenditures, as well as the scope of the disclosure requirement.
Influenced by a footnote in another portion of the Buckley opinion, 30 most
of the lower federal courts that have considered whether a particular
advertisement constitutes express advocacy or issue advocacy have applied
the so-called "magic words" test, thereby limiting express advocacy to
communications that literally ask voters to "vote 31for," "elect," "cast your
ballot for," "vote against," or "defeat" a candidate.
With the courts relying on the "magic words" test to distinguish between
express advocacy that is subject to regulation and issue advocacy
constitutionally exempt from disclosure requirements and other rules, it has
become "child's play for political advertisers and campaign professionals"
to craft ads that effectively promote or "oppose the cause of a named
"The most common tactic
candidate but stop short of express advocacy.
for political advertisers is to include some language calling for the reader,
viewer, or listener to respond to the message by doing something other than
voting." 33 "By combining sharp criticism of a candidate with an
27. Id.
28. Id. at 80.
29. See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/PoliticsLine, 77 TEX.
L. REv. 1751, 1751-63 (1999).
30. 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
31. See, e.g., FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1062-64 (4th Cir.
1997); Faucher v. FEC, 928 F.2d 468, 470 (1st Cir. 1991). The only partial exception is FEC v.
Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), which held that an election eve newspaper
advertisement that combined sharp criticism of President Carter's record with the caption and
exhortation "Don't Let Him Do It" constituted express advocacy in light of the timing of the ad.
Id. at 865. Other courts have rejected Furgatch'sattention to context. See, e.g., Fla. Right to
Life v. Lamar, 238 F.3d 1288, 1289 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Citizens for Responsible Gov't State PAC
v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000).
32. Briffault, supra note 29, at 1759.
33. Briffault, supra note 29, at 1759.
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exhortation to call the sponsor or the candidate criticized, these ads can
inoculate themselves from the charge that they constitute express
advocacy." 34 This has led to an explosion of issue advocacy. One recent
study concluded that35 $213 million was spent on electioneering issue ads in
calendar year 2000.
Issue ads were initially the province of nonparty groups, but in recent
years issue advocacy has intersected with soft money to become an
important party activity. 36 In 1995, the FEC ruled that the national party
committees could use soft money to defray part of the costs of ads that
combined discussions of issues with criticism of named officeholders. 37 In
the 1996 election, the parties spent an estimated $68 million on soft money
funded issue ads. 38 In calendar year 2000, the parties spent $162 million on
such electioneering issue ads. 39 The parties, thus, accounted for 76% of
total issue advocacy spending, and issue ads accounted for
37.8% of party
40
cycle.
election
1999-2000
the
during
soft money spending
B.

BCRA, Soft Money, and the Constitution

1. Provisions of the New Law: BCRA restricts soft money in
several ways
First, it prohibits the national committees of the political parties from
soliciting, receiving, or directing to another person, or spending any money
that is not subject to the "limitations, prohibitions, and reporting
requirements" of federal campaign finance law. 4 1 This is a complete ban on
dealing in soft money, and apparently applies even to activities unrelated to
the support of candidates for federal office.

34. Briffault, supra note 29, at 1759-60.
35. HOLMAN & MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 23, at 31, figs. 4-5.
36. Briffault, supra note 29, at 1760-61.
37. FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25 (1995) available at http://hemdon3.sdrdc.com/ao/ao/
950025.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2003).
38. Deborah Beck et al., Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 1996 Campaign 3, 34, 55
(1997), at http://www.appcpenn.org/political/issueads/REP16.PDF (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
39. See HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note 23, at 31.
40. See HOLMAN & MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 23, at 74.
41. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101(a), 116 Stat. 81
(2002) (adding new section 323(a) to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, to be codified
at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)). BCRA also precludes national and state parties from soliciting funds for
or transferring funds to tax exempt organizations. Id.
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Second, the measure provides that federal candidates, federal
officeholders and their agents may not "solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or
spend funds" unless the funds comply with FECA's dollar limitations and
source prohibitions.42 Federal officials would be completely barred from
dealing with soft money, even for non-federal election purposes.43
Third, BCRA curbs the soft money activities of state and local political
parties. This is necessary for effective control over soft money since a ban
limited to the national parties would most likely lead donors and party
leaders to redirect their efforts to the state and local parties. Indeed, even
now, when national party committees are free to accept and spend soft
money, state and local committees play a pivotal role in party soft money
spending. Under the FEC's rules for combining hard and soft money in the
financing of mixed federal/nonfederal activities, the state parties can
generally pay for a significantly greater portion of their activities from soft
money than can their national counterparts. 44 Consequently, in recent
elections the national parties have directed or transferred millions of dollars
of soft money to the state parties. In 1999-2000, the national party
committees reported transferring $265 million in soft money (or more than
45
half of their total soft money receipts) to state and local party committees.
Hence, some regulation of state and local party finances is essential to
effectuate soft money regulation. However, since a portion of state and
local party spending is undoubtedly aimed at nonfederal elections, a
complete ban on state and local party acceptance and receipt of soft money
comparable to the restriction on the national parties would constitute an
unprecedented federalization of state and local election campaign finances.
BCRA does not regulate all state and local party fundraising and
spending. Instead, like FECA, it focuses on the federal election-related
activities of state and local parties, but widens the definition of regulated
state and local party federal election activity to include expenditures that
benefit federal candidates even though they are not aimed at federal
42. Id. (adding new section 323(e) to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, to be
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)).
43. Id. The law makes an exception permitting a federal officeholder running for state
office to solicit and accept funds that do not comply with FECA's requirements provided they
comply with any applicable state restrictions. Id.
44. The FEC requires that mixed federal/nonfederal spending by national party
committees be financed 60% with hard money and 40% with soft money in non-presidential
election cycles and 65% with hard money and 35% with soft money in presidential election
cycles. 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(b)(2)(i) (2002). For state parties, the hard/soft allocation is based on
the federal share of the total number of federal and state offices on the state ballot. As there are
typically far more state than federal offices up for election on any state ballot, state parties may
fund most of their mixed federal/nonfederal activities out of soft money. Id.
45. See FEC Reports Increasein PartyFundraisingfor 2000, supra note 20.
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candidates explicitly or exclusively. Thus, the statute defines state and local
party "federal election activity" to include:
(i) voter registration activity during the period beginning 120
days before a regularly46 scheduled federal election and
running until the election;
(ii) "voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, or generic
campaign activity conducted in connection with an election
in which a candidate for Federal office appears on the
ballot ... ; 4I
(iii) any public communication that "refers to a clearly
identified candidate for Federal office ... and that promotes
or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes
a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the
communication expressly advocates a vote for or against that
candidate);" 48 and
(iv) the services of any state or local political party employee
in any month in which the employee spends more than 25%
of her compensated time on activities in connection with a
federal election.49
The measure makes one significant exception to these restrictions on soft
money. Individuals would be allowed to donate up to $10,000 per calendar
year to state and local political parties for use on voter registration and
mobilization and generic party activity, provided the activities do not refer
to a clearly identified candidate for federal office.5°

46 § 101(b) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i)).
47. Id. (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(ii)). "Generic campaign activity" is
defined as an activity "that promotes a political party and does not promote a candidate ....
Id. (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(21)).
48. Id. (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii)). "Public communication" is defined
as a communication by "broadcast, cable or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine,
outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other
form of general public political advertising." Id. (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(22)).
49. Id. (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iv)).
50. Id. § 101(a) (adding new section 323(b)(2) to the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)). These donations for voter registration, voter
mobilization, and generic party activity would be subject to allocation between federal and
nonfederal accounts pursuant to regulations prescribed by the FEC, and would be subject to
applicable state laws. Id.
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The Constitutional Framework: Soft money is a type of
contribution to political parties

Starting with Buckley v. Valeo,51 the Supreme Court has consistently
sustained limits on contributions. Buckley held that contributions are a form
of political speech, so that restrictions on contributions are subject to First
Amendment review. 52 But the Court minimized the speech value of
contributions, finding that "[w]hile contributions may result in political
expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the
voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves
speech by someone other than the contributor.",53 Moreover, the Court
found that contribution limits only modestly impinge on the donor's ability
to support her candidate, since the contributor can engage in54independent
expenditures or "assist personally" in support of the candidate.
Buckley held that contributions may be limited to prevent "the actuality
and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions." 55 In defining "corruption," Buckley focused on the idea of
the quid pro quo, but the Court declined to limit corruption to donorcandidate deals and held that Congress could use contribution restrictions to
curtail the power of money "to influence government action" in ways less
"blatant and specific" than bribery. 56 More recently, in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PA C,57 the Court confirmed that "corruption" sweeps
wider than outright bribery and picks up "the broader threat from politicians
too compliant with the wishes of large contributors." 58 Shrink Missouri
determined that contribution limits are presumptively justified by the
anticorruption goal. The Court observed that "the dangers of large, corrupt
contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are
neither novel nor implausible . . . . [T]here is little reason to doubt that
sometimes large contributions will work actual corruption of our political
system, and no reason to question the existence of a corresponding
suspicion among voters." 59 As a result, a contribution limit could be

51. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 14-23.
53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at. 22; see also id. at 21 (stating that, although a contribution expresses the donor's
support for the recipient, it is merely a "general expression of support for the candidate and his
views, [it] does not communicate the underlying basis for the support").
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id. at 28.
57. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
58. Id. at 389.
59. Id. at 391,395.
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sustained even without "extensive evidentiary documentation"
that
60
contributions above the limit were actually corrupting.
Buckley and Shrink Missouri dealt with contributions to candidates.
These cases directly support the restrictions on donations to and fundraising
by federal officials and candidates. The danger of inappropriate influence,
and of the appearance of inappropriate influence, is posed when federal
candidates and officeholders solicit, collect, or direct the contribution of
funds whether or not the funds are used for the candidate's or officeholder's
own campaign. BCRA's soft money rules, however, go beyond regulating
candidates and also restrict party committees. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has held that the concern about corruption can justify not simply
limits on donations to candidates, but also limits on donations to
intermediary organizations that collect funds and then use them to make
contributions to candidates.
California Medical Association v. FEC 61 upheld a provision of FECA
that limits the donations an association can give to its own political action
committee ("PAC"). Although there was no danger the organization would
"corrupt" its PAC-indeed the organization had the legal authority to
determine which candidates the PAC would support62-the Court found that
if there were no limit on the organization's donations to its PAC then the
organization might use donations to the PAC to circumvent the statutory
limit on the organization's contributions to candidates. 63
Thus,
contributions by the association to its PAC could be limited to "protect
the
64
integrity of the contribution restrictions" on donations to candidates.
In 2001, the Court reaffirmed the legitimacy of this anti-circumvention
concern and applied it to political parties in FEC v. Colorado Republican
FederalElection Campaign Committee ("Colorado Republican It').65 The
Court found that special interest donors attempt to use the parties to pursue
the donors' agendas, and found evidence in the record compiled by the trial
court that donors give to parties in order to aid specific candidates, with the
parties tracking the connections between particular donors and particular
candidates. 66 In other words, donor use of the parties as conduits to
60. Id. at 394.
61. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
62. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(d) (2002); FEC Advisory Op. 1975-23, Fed. Election Camp.
Fin. Guide (CCH) 10,085 (1975); see also Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407
U.S. 385, 415-17 (1972).
63. Cal. Med. Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 197-99 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 203-04
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 199.
65. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).
66. Id. at 457-60.
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circumvent the limitations on direct donations to candidates was not just a
theoretical possibility but a campaign finance practice. The Court ruled that
the anti-corruption concern provides a constitutional justification for
limitations on party support for candidates. 67 The anti-corruption rationale,
thus, permits restrictions on the activities of intermediaries as well as
candidates.
But it is still grounded in a concern about the potential impact of
campaign contributions on the behavior of candidates if and when they
become officeholders.
Indeed, the impact of contributions and the
fundraising process on candidates, officeholders, and the integrity of
government are central to the Court's approach to campaign finance
regulation. 68 Thus, the Court has rejected the argument that high levels of
political spending or significant inequalities in spending among competing
interest groups constitute corruption, since neither spending per se nor
spending inequalities affect the actions of officeholders. 69 As soft money,
by definition, funds party activity not directly related to the election of
federal candidates, BCRA's restrictions can be sustained only if the noncandidate-related activities funded by soft money pose a danger of the
corruption or the appearance of corruption of federal officeholders akin to
that presented by direct contributions to or coordinated expenditures with
candidates. The next section indicates that BCRA's restrictions on state and
local party "federal election activity" are, for the most part, aimed at
reaching donations that would fund expenditures that would benefit federal
candidates. Although they stretch the scope of federal campaign finance
law, they are consistent with its traditional concern with donor-candidate
corruption. The Act's limits on national party committees go further, and
restrict donations for all party activities, whether or not they benefit federal
candidates or are used in federal elections. These limitations can be
sustained only if the Court goes further and is willing to find that the close
relationship between the national parties and federal officeholders generally
supports limitations on the fundraising activities of the national parties.

67. Id. at 465.
68. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1976) (per curiam).
69. Id. at 48-49; Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 297
(1981); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978).
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Constitutionality of the Limits on State and Local Party Soft
Money

Issue advocacy is the single most significant use ofparty soft money

The restrictions on contributions that fund party issue advocacy are at the
heart of the claim that the Act's soft money provisions are
unconstitutional.70 BCRA precludes state and local parties from using soft
money on public communications that refer to a clearly identified candidate
for federal office and promote or oppose that candidate regardless of
whether the communication is express advocacy. With respect to state and
local party electioneering, it, thus, mounts a frontal assault on the "magic
words" doctrine. BCRA definition is sweeping in its scope. It makes no
reference to the timing or context of the public communication.
Conceivably, it could apply to any ad that couples praise or criticism of a
pending legislative bill with reference to an officeholder (who is a candidate
for reelection) who supports or opposes it. An ad criticizing the McCainFeingold bill, for example, might be treated as federal election activity if
run in McCain's or Feingold's home state in a year when the senator is
running for reelection, even if the ad appears well before election day and at
a time when the bill is being actively debated on the Senate floor.
Although the definition of federal election-related communications
would probably be overbroad if applied to the communications of nonparty
interest groups, it is limited to money used to fund advertising by political
parties. As a result, it ought to pass constitutional muster.
The First Amendment line distinguishing election-related from nonelection-related speech ought to differ for parties as opposed to nonparty
organizations and individuals. Nonparty groups participate in politics in
order to advance certain issue agendas, protect certain interests, or affect
public policy. For them, election-related activity may be only one of a
number of techniques-including legislative lobbying, advertising aimed at
influencing public opinion, or grassroots organizing-affecting the political
process. Winning elections is likely to be a means to the end of advancing
certain policy goals, rather than an end in itself. When nonparty groups
engage in speech that mingles references to elected officials or candidates
with the discussion of issues, it is quite possible that their aim is to
influence official decision making or even the debate about issues in the
70.

See Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, HardRealities: The ConstitutionalProhibitionon

a Soft Money Ban, 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 184-96 (1998); Jacobus v. Alaska, 182 F. Supp. 2d 881,
886-90 (D. Alaska 2001); Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 4
P.3d 808, 818-29 (Wash. 2000).
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electoral context, rather than the election itself. To be sure, even speech by
nonparty organizations that combines discussions of issues with references
to candidates is likely to be election-related when broadcast in the Weeks
immediately before an election. But the definition of express advocacy
must acknowledge that nonparty speakers have important political interests
other than the election of candidates.
The major political parties are quite different. The overarching goal of
party committee spending is the election of party candidates to office and
thereby securing or maintaining party political power. This is not to say
that the major political parties have no interest in ideology or issues. To the
contrary, the two great national parties were founded for ideological reasons
and contemporary party activists often have strong ideological bents. Some
party speech may be about issues, but parties focus their energies
overwhelmingly on the election of candidates. When ads by nonparty
groups combine discussions of issues and candidates, it may not always be
clear whether the goal is to advance an issue's agenda or to elect candidates.
But when a party combines an issue discussion with a reference to a clearly
identified candidate, its goal is almost certainly the election of its candidate
or the defeat of the candidate of the other party.71
BCRA's reference to "a clearly identified candidate" for federal office
provides a bright, objective line for distinguishing electioneering
communications from generic party issue speech. 72 The restriction thus
avoids the charge of vagueness. Given the parties' institutional focus on the
election of candidates, a party communication that promotes or opposes a
clearly identified federal candidate is almost certainly part of the party's
campaign to promote the election or defeat of the candidate even if the
communication also includes advocacy concerning an issue or fails to use
the "magic words" of express advocacy. As a result, the Act is not
overbroad with respect to party speech.
In effect, this approach links party speech to candidate speech. When a
candidate spends money to broadcast a campaign message, it is
automatically considered to be election related even if the candidate's ad
discusses issues or refrains from using the "magic words" of express
advocacy. 73 Parties are not quite candidates, and they may have goals other
than the election of candidates. But when a party communication clearly
71. See HOLMAN & MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 23, at 31, figs. 4-5 (100% of party issue ads
in calendar 2000 were electioneering; by comparison only 58% of interest group issue ads in
calendar 2000 were electioneering).
72. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 81
(2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)).
73. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
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refers to a federal candidate and includes language promoting or opposing a
candidate, the party has crossed the line from general discussion of issues to
participation in an election campaign. Money contributed to a party to
finance such speech is effectively a contribution for the benefit of the
party's candidate. Like a candidate's campaign speech, a party's campaign
speech ought to be hard-money funded regardless of whether the speech
deploys the "magic words" of express advocacy. If state and local parties
want to disseminate messages concerning issues free of FECA's restrictions
they may still do so if they avoid promoting or opposing clearly identified
candidates.
The Supreme Court may have hinted at this in Buckley. In determining
the constitutional scope of campaign finance regulation, the Court found no
need to apply a limiting construction to contributions to and expenditures by
candidates. Whether or not they use the "magic words, 7 4 the candidate
activities were treated as presumptively electioneering.75 The Court,
however, went slightly further, noting that this broad approach applies also
to
organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the major
purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate.
Expenditures of candidates and of "political committees" so
construed can be assumed to fall within the core area sought to be
addressed
by Congress. They are, by definition, campaign
76
related.

There is a strong argument that organizations, "the major purpose of which
is the nomination or election of a candidate, 77 ought to include political
parties. Even if by that phrase the Court meant only committees controlled
by particular candidates, nothing in the Court's jurisprudence precludes a
broad definition of party electioneering. In light of the empirical evidence
of the electioneering nature of most contemporary issue advocacy 78 and of
74. Scarcely any political advertiser--candidates, parties, or interest groups-use the
"magic words" in their ads. See HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note 23, at 43, fig. 5-5 (only

10% of candidates ads and 2% of party and interest group ads use the "magic words").
75. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78-79.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 79.
Id.
See, e.g., David B. Magleby, Dictum Without Data: The Myth of Issue Advocacy and

Party Building 10, at http://www.byu.edu/outsidemoney/dictum (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) (both
national voter survey and focus groups found that viewers see party issue ads as "focused on
electing or defeating the candidates rather than on party-building" or helping a political party);
HOLMAN & MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 23, at 64 (of 231,000 party ads reviewed, 96% mentioned
or depicted candidates; 91.8% made no mention of party name "let alone encouraged voters to
register with a party, to volunteer with the local party organization, or to support the party"; but
despite the heavy emphasis on candidates, only 2.3% of party ads used the "magic words").
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the cooperation between parties and candidates in conducting issue
advocacy campaigns,79 party electioneering public communications with
respect to clearly identified candidates raise the conduit or anticircumvention concerns that Colorado Republican II held justify limits on
party coordinated expenditures and thus, a fortiori, justify limitations on
contributions to the parties. A law that treats party messages promoting or
attacking clearly identified candidates as election-related speech ought to be
constitutional.
b.

Otherstate and localpartyfederal election activity

The restrictions on the funds that parties may use for voter registration
within 120 days of a regularly scheduled election, get-out-the-vote, generic
party activities, and party staff salaries are not as closely focused on the
election of specific candidates as electioneering ads with respect to clearly
identified candidates. These activities are more likely to involve a party's
support for its ticket of federal and state candidates generally rather than
specific candidates. Nevertheless, there is plainly a connection between the
election of candidates and voter registration and turnout work and state
party staff support for federal candidates. Voter mobilization activities
directly aid the party's candidates on the ballot, as do the efforts of party
workers. Consequently, contributions that fund such activity create the
possibility of inappropriate relationships between the donors and the federal
candidates who benefit from the expenditures.
More troublesome is the provision applying the soft money ban to
"generic campaign activity conducted in connection with an election in
which a candidate for Federal office appears on the ballot."80 The Act
defines "generic campaign activity" as an "activity that promotes a political
party and does not promote a candidate or non-Federal candidate."' 1 This
provision appears to be intended to reach ads, handbills, or other campaign
devices that state simply "vote Republican" or "Democrats," without
naming any specific Democratic or Republican candidate. Certainly, like
voter registration activity in the pre-election period, generic spending can
help the candidate of the party promoted. Contributions to the party for
such activity can be a source of donor-candidate influence and, so, under
79. See, e.g., Election Advocacy: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000
CongressionalElections 8 (David B. Magleby ed.) (noting the "congruence in issue agendas
between party committees and candidates"), at http://www.byu.edu/outsidemoney/2000general
/index.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
80. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 101(b), 116 Stat. 81
(2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C § 431(20)(A)(ii)).

81.

Id. (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(21)).
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ColoradoRepublican II may be regulated.8 2 But the provision is subject to
challenge as vague and overbroad. Unlike the provision dealing with
electioneering issue advocacy, there is no requirement that the expenditure
refer to a clearly identified candidate; indeed, the definition of generic
83
campaign activity provides that it does not promote a candidate.
Moreover, although the restriction is limited to generic activity "in
connection with an election," 84 unlike the provision limiting contributions
with respect to party pre-election voter registration activities, the generic
campaign activity provision does not define "in connection with an
election" or impose a temporal limit.8 5 Thus, an ad that contains neither
words of electoral advocacy nor reference to a candidate, and that runs more
than a year before an election would be subject to the soft money limitation.
This could mean that all state and local party speech that promotes the party
or party positions-"Republicans are the party of tax relief," "Democrats
protect Social Security"-would be subject to treatment as generic activity
on behalf of federal candidates. With federal elections every two years, and
preparation for the next race often beginning just after the conclusion of the
last one, all state and local party speech that promotes the party or party
positions could be treated as generic activity on behalf of federal candidates.
This seems too broad. Although most party communications are
undoubtedly aimed at the election of party candidates to office, some may
be addressed to policy issues or to building support for the party as an
organization of people with shared or overlapping political views.
Moreover, party messages that do not refer to candidates at all and that are
aired many months before the next election may have little direct bearing on
particular races. As a result, donations to the party that fund such messages
are less likely to represent instances of large donors using the party as a
conduit for obtaining undue influence with benefited candidates.
The generic activity provision might be saved by targeting it on spending
likely to effect an election, and therefore likely to benefit candidates and
generate candidate gratitude to the donors financing the expenditures. This
could be done by importing some temporal limitation, like the 120-day rule
for treating voter registration activity as federal election activity. In the
absence of either a temporal limit or a reference to a specific candidate, the
generic activity provision would be difficult to justify under Colorado
Republican II as a measure designed to prevent the party from serving as a
conduit for contributions to candidates. Otherwise, the generic activity
82.
83.
84.
85.

FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Election Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001).
§ 101(b) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(21)).
Id. (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(ii)).
Id. (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431(21)).
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provision can be sustained-if it can be sustained at all-only under the
rationale outlined below for the limits on donations to national party
committees.
Generic activity aside, however, BCRA's limits on state and local parties
appear well-designed to withstand both federalism and First Amendment
based challenges. They focus on state and local party activity with a direct
impact on federal elections, and they target state and local party
communications that, by their terms, clearly concern federal elections.
4.

Constitutionality of the Limits on the National Parties

BCRA absolutely bars the national party committees from accepting and
spending money that does not comply with FECA.16 This limitation applies
87
not just to party support for federal candidates but to all party spending.
This strains the conduit or anti-circumvention model embraced by Colorado
Republican I. Some party activities may concern public policies, issues,
and ideas not directly connected to the election of candidates. So, too, a
party may engage in grassroots organizing, or the operation and
maintenance of the party organization as an institution apart from its
candidates. Such party spending constitutes political speech protected by
the First Amendment. In the absence of a direct connection between such
spending and the campaigns of federal candidates, is there a corruption
danger that would justify limitations on donations that fund such noncandidate-related or non-election-related activity?
There is such a justification growing out of the connections between
national party fundraising and the central role of the leaders of the national
Political scientists
political parties in the federal government.
conventionally distinguish among the "party-in-electorate," the "party-asorganization," and the "party-in-government., 88 Under this division, the
party-as-organization provides money, staff, and other resources for party
candidates. The party-in-government, meanwhile, organizes the executive
branch and Congress, provides legislative leadership, determines the
composition and control of legislative committees, and ultimately shapes
the legislative agenda, the policymaking process, and the decisions and
votes of those who hold elective office. Under the current campaign
system, particularly with the rise of soft money, however, the party-asorganization and the party-in-government are increasingly merged. The
See id. §101(a) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i).
See id.
See, e.g., JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE
POLITICAL PARTIES INAMERICA 10 (1995).
86.
87.
88.

ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
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party congressional campaign committees are major players in the
collection and distribution of soft money. In 2000, the House and Senate
Democratic campaign committees accounted for almost half of the
Democratic party's soft money receipts; their Republican congressional
counterparts collected more than one-third of Republican party soft
money. 89 Members of Congress directly constitute and control these
committees. 9° The President effectively controls his party's national
committee, and, once a favorite has emerged for the presidential nomination
of the other party, that candidate and his party's national committee
typically work closely together. Moreover, the President, other members of
the executive branch, and leading members of Congress and other national
leaders play a central role in national party fundraising. Critical to the
explosion of soft money collection has been the national parties' use of
access to government leaders-White House coffees, stays in the Lincoln
Bedroom, golfing holidays with the congressional leadership--as an
incentive to, and reward for, large soft money donations. "Cash-for-access
confabs on pending bills are business as usual in Washington." 91 The soft
money fundraising process is fueled by direct, ongoing, and sustained
contacts between large donors and potential donors and our national
political leaders, operating in their dual roles as senior government
policymakers and party leaders.
The corruption danger posed by large soft money donations to the
national parties is not so much that the parties will act as conduits
channeling those donations to particular candidates chosen by the donors,
but rather that the process of party fundraising will give large donors special
relationships with the party's fundraisers-who are also the leaders of the
party-in-government. This fits squarely with Buckley's concern with
corruption and the appearance of corruption. Although some national party
soft money may be spent for purposes other than the support of federal
candidates, the process by which national party leaders collect large soft
money contributions presents the danger of undue influence over
officeholders-and the appearance of such undue influence-regardless of
the purposes for which the moneys so collected are used. With federal
officials or national leaders heading the fundraising committees, dominating
89. See FEC Reports Increase in Party Fundraisingfor 2000, supra note 20. The two
Democratic congressional campaign committees collected $120.4 million in soft money out of
total Democratic soft money receipts of $245.2 million. Id. Their Republican counterparts

collected $91.9 million out of total Republican soft money receipts of $249.9 million. Id.
90. See ROBIN KOLODNY, PURSUING MAJORITIES: CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 167 (1998).
91. Phil Kuntz, Cash-for-Access Policy Forums on Bills Are Common, Controversial in
Senate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2000, at A20.
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party decision-making, or using access to themselves to stimulate donations,
then all such donations give rise to "the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors" 92 even if the contributions
are not used in those politicians' campaigns.
In a sense, this argument resembles the claim by Justices Kennedy and
Thomas that there is a "practical identity of interests" between a party and
its candidates. Although they made this argument in order to invalidate
regulations that limit the ability of a party to support its candidates, 93 my
focus is less on the candidates and more on the officeholders who constitute
party campaign committees, raise funds for the committees, or provide the
access that serves as a major incentive to donors to party committees.
Where Justices Kennedy and Thomas saw party-candidate unity as a basis
for voiding limits on party support for candidates since parties cannot
corrupt their candidates, I am suggesting that party-officeholder unity
provides a reason for treating the arguably corrupting effect of large
donations, and of the fundraising process as a whole, on the parties as also
potentially corrupting officeholders and the operations of government
generally.
C.

Nonparty Issue Advocacy

BCRA also addresses issue advocacy by individuals and groups other
than political parties. It does so in several ways. First, it expands FECA's
disclosure requirement to apply to a newly defined category of
electioneering communications.
Second, it extends the longstanding
federal proscriptions on corporate and labor union contributions and
expenditures
in
federal elections
to
include
"electioneering
communications." 95 In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,9 6 the
Supreme Court expressly upheld the ban on corporate election expenditures,
explaining that various "state-created advantages" conferred on
corporations-such as "limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable
treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets"-enable them to
92. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2002).
93. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Election Campaign Comm., 518 U.S. 604, 629-30
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Election Campaign Comm.,
533 U.S. 431, 468-69 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
94. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(a), 116 Stat. 81
(2002) (adding new subsection (f) to Section 304 to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
as amended by section 103, to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)).
95. Id. § 203 (amending section 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, to be
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)-441c).
96. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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use "'resources amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace."' 97 Corporate contributions and
spending may be prohibited to address "the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or 98
no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas."
Consistent with the focus on the lack of a link between corporate funds
and the support for a corporation's political positions, the Court, in FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. ("MCFL"),99 held that the ban on
corporate campaign expenditures cannot be applied to not-for-profit
corporations "formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas"
and that do not engage in business activities, have "no shareholders or other
persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings," and do not
100
accept contributions from business corporations or labor unions.
Although these organizations may take the corporate form, their "political
resources reflect political support,"'' 1 and thus, they do not present the
dangers of business corporations. BCRA implements MCFL by exempting
from the new restrictions on electioneering communications certain taxexempt corporations that receive their funds solely from American citizens
or permanent residents, and tax-exempt corporations that also receive funds
from business activities or business corporations or unions if the tax-exempt
entity creates a segregated account to which only individuals can contribute
10 2
and pays for its electioneering communications solely from that account.
Further complicating the treatment of corporate electioneering
communications, BCRA provides that the exception for tax-exempt entities
does not apply to a "targeted" electioneering communication which refers to
a "clearly identified candidate" for federal office and uses television, radio,
or cable or satellite services to send a communication capable of being
97.

Id. at 658-59.

98. Id. at 660. The Court has not given comparable attention in the post-Buckley era to the
limitations on labor unions. Arguably, the same combination of government-provided support
and lack of correlation between the payment of union dues and support for the union's electoral
position provide support for the limits on unions, although it could be argued that unions benefit
less from state support and that the right of nonunion members in closed shop states to withhold
dues used to finance political activity, Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988), limits the applicability of Austin to unions. In any event, corporations and unions are
usually treated together in the campaign finance context and I will follow that pattern in this
article.
99. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
100. Id. at 264.
101. Id.
102. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat.
81 (2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)-441c).
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received by 50,000 people or more in a congressional district if the "clearly
the "clearly
identified candidate" is running in that district or in a state if
03
state.'
that
from
Senate
the
for
running
is
candidate"
identified
For both the new disclosure requirements and the limitations on
corporate and union expenditures, the key concept is "electioneering
communication." BCRA provides two definitions for that term. The
primary definition provides that an electioneering communication is a
broadcast, cable or satellite communication which refers to a clearly
identified candidate for federal office and is made within sixty days before a
general, special or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate, is
made within thirty days of a primary election for the office sought by the
candidate or of a convention or caucus of a party with the authority to
nominate a candidate for that office, and is targeted to the relevant
electorate.104 BCRA also includes an unusual back-up definition stating
that if the first definition of "electioneering communication" is held
unconstitutional, then the term shall be defined to refer to a broadcast, cable
or attacks or
or satellite communication "which promotes or supports .
opposes" a candidate "regardless of whether the communication expressly
advocates a vote for or against a candidate" and "which is also suggestive of
other than an exhortation to vote for or against a
no plausible meaning
10 5
candidate."'
specific
BCRA, thus, directly challenges the lower court decisions holding that,
as a constitutional matter, election-related speech consists solely of express
advocacy within the meaning of the "magic words." The primary definition
of "electioneering communication" is clearly the crucial one since the
second, backup definition would only slightly expand the current judicial
definition of express advocacy.' ° 6 Indeed, although it would still be
103. See id. § 204 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C § 441b(6)).
104. See id. § 201 (amending § 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended by section 103, to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)).
105. Id. to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)).
106. The "no plausible meaning" provision appears to be a paraphrase of the determination
of the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), that a message could
constitute express advocacy if it is "susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an
exhortation to vote ...... Id. at 864. The Furgatch standard was adopted by the FEC in a
regulation defining express advocacy. See II C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (2002); see also Elections Bd.
v. Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, 597 N.W.2d 721, 733 (Wis. 1999); Crumpton v. Keisling, 982 P.2d
3, 10-11 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (applying Furgatch to Oregon disclosure law enforceable by civil,
Several courts, however, have held the FEC regulation
but not criminal, sanctions).
unconstitutional or have determined that Furgatch departed too far from Buckley's "magic
words" approach. See, e.g., FEC v. Me. Right to Life Comm., Inc., 98 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)
(invalidating FEC regulation); Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d
248, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same); FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1053
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constitutionally controversial, the backup definition would probably have
little effect. Courts have been surprisingly capable of finding that even ads
that sharply criticize a candidate while refraining from express advocacy
can have more than one "plausible" meaning. The Washington Supreme
Court, for example, found that a Republican Party ad that denounced
Democratic gubernatorial candidate Gary Locke's opposition to a "Three
Strikes, You're Out" sentencing law, Locke's alleged opposition to "more
cops on the streets in King County," and Locke's alleged support for a plan
to "give self-esteem training to prostitutes and pay for a newsletter for those
employed in the 'sex industry,"' and then called on viewers to "Tell Gary
Locke that's not what we call getting tough on crime views"'10 7 had more
than one plausible meaning:
[I]f a voter intending to vote for Gary Locke in the gubernatorial
election watched the 'Tell Gary Locke' commercial, that voter
could (1) change his or her vote; or (2) contact Gary Locke to
inform him that he or she disagrees with his stance
on crime, but
10 8
cast his or her vote for Gary Locke nonetheless.
Similarly, a federal district court reviewing an ad that referred to
candidate Bill Clinton's support for "'radical' homosexual causes," and
combined "a series of pictures depicting advocates of homosexual rights,
apparently gay men and lesbians, demonstrating at a political march," with
"the visual degrading of candidate Clinton's picture into a black and white
negative," "ominous music," and "unfavorable coloring" concluded that the
ad could be read as "openly hostile" to the gay rights positions it attributed
to Clinton, but was not an anti-Clinton ad per se. 09 With our post-modem
courts straining to find more than one possible interpretation of a campaign
ad, and precedents indicating that criticism of a candidate might be read as
seeking to influence that candidate to change his views (or to persuade the
viewer to contact the candidate to get him to change his views), the backup
definition could easily collapse back into the "magic words" test.
The primary definition, by contrast, would be a significant change from
the current doctrinal approach. It proceeds from the assumption that public
communications concerning a clearly identified candidate for federal office
during the immediate pre-election period are intended to be-and are likely
(4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting FEC argument based on Furgatch); Fla. Right to Life, Inc. v. Lamar,

238 F.3d 1288, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001) (same).
107. See Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. Pub. Disclosure Comm'n, 4 P.3d 808,
812-13 (Wash. 2000).
108. See id. at 822.
109. FEC v. Christian Action Network, 894 F. Supp. 946, 948, 953-56 (W.D. Va.), aff'd
mem., 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1996).
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to be-perceived by voters as election-related, and thus, are likely to have
an impact on the election. By using a precisely determined bright-line
definition of the pre-election period, it avoids the charge of vagueness.
Those who would disseminate such ads know that they will be subject to
regulation for ads in the defined pre-election period. The only real question
is whether treating all broadcast communications concerning a clearly
defined candidate in the sixty days preceding a general election, and the
thirty days preceding a primary, is narrowly tailored to the constitutional
purposes of providing disclosure of the sources of funding of electionrelated communications and curtailing the use of corporate business and
labor union treasury funds or rather is, instead, overbroad.
Certainly, the timing of a communication affects its meaning. An
election-eve message that combines references to a clearly identified
candidate and to issues is far more likely to affect voter thinking about the
election than about political issues generally precisely because the message
is broadcast on the eve of an election. The weeks right before election day
are the highpoint of the election campaign. This is the period when voters
are most likely to be considering their election day decisions, and
communications concerning candidates are most likely to affect their
Information and arguments concerning clearly identified
decision.
candidates that are presented at this time can have an impact on the election.
By the same token, the likelihood that such communications are aimed at,
or are likely to affect, other political activity in this period is limited since
both the legislature and the executive branch are likely to be focused on the
election. 110 As for the specific sixty-day and thirty-day periods chosen,
there is considerable empirical evidence that the overwhelming majority of
ads aired in this period that refer to clearly identified candidates are
perceived by the voters as election-related rather than about issues. 111
To be sure, the sixty days before the general election seems like a
relatively long period for treating all references to candidates as election
related. Congress may still be in session for part of that period, and there
may be intense debates concerning pending legislation. Still, the reference
in an ad to a clearly identified candidate suggests that something more than
just influencing legislative action is behind broadcasting the ad. Moreover,
sixty days before a federal general election typically falls around Labor Day
110. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 1783.
111. HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note 23, at 72-73 (less than 1% of more than 50,000
ads aired during this period in the 2000 election that mentioned candidates were genuine issue
ads); Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to Determine the
Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue Advocacy, 85 MINN. L.
REv. 1773, 1795-99 (2001).
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which is traditionally seen as the start of the final run-up to election day. In
light of American political practices, sixty days is a reasonable definition of
the pre-election period.112
The determination of the precise scope of the pre-election period-like
the number of petition signatures needed to place a candidate on the
ballot," 3 the number of feet from the polling place in which the state may
bar electioneering, 14or, most pertinently, the dollar threshold that ought to
trigger disclosure and reporting requirements'l1-is ultimately uncertain.
Just as there are no "magic words" of advocacy there are no magic days that
define the pre-election period. As the Supreme Court observed in
upholding FECA's disclosure thresholds, this is "necessarily a judgmental
decision, best left in the context of this complex legislation to congressional
discretion."' 6
BCRA's definition of electioneering communication is, thus, neither
vague nor overbroad. It is consistent with Buckley's desire to sharply
distinguish between election-related speech that may be subject to
regulation and other political speech that is constitutionally exempt from
regulation. To be sure, it departs from Buckley's express advocacy/issue
advocacy distinction, but that is justified by evidence from the issue
advocacy advertising over the last decade that the traditional definition of
express advocacy utterly fails to provide a meaningful distinction between
election-related activity and other political activity. The Supreme Court has
addressed the express advocacy/issue advocacy distinction only once since
Buckley, and that was in a casual way, in a case decided more than fifteen
years ago, or well before the upsurge of issue advocacy. 17 Several Justices
112. Sixty days is actually narrower than the ninety-day pre-election period used by the
House of Representatives to bar House members from using the congressional frank to send
mass mailings to their districts. See 39 U.S.C. 3210(a)(6)(A) (2000).
113. See, e.g., Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431,432 (1971).
114. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193-94 (1992).
115. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 82-84 (1976) (per curiam).
116. Id. at 83.
117. In FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., ("MCFL") 479 U.S. 238 (1986), the Court
considered the "special edition" of an anti-abortion group's newsletter, which listed state and

federal candidates contesting an upcoming primary, identified the candidates' positions on three
litmus test issues, provided photographs of those with one hundred percent favorable voting
records, but not of other candidates, and exhorted readers to vote for the anti-abortion
candidates. The Court concluded that although the newsletter never explicitly called for votes
for particular candidates, it constituted express advocacy: The Special Edition could not "be
regarded as a mere discussion of public issues that by their nature raise the names of certain
politicians. Rather, it provides in effect an explicit directive: vote for these (named)
candidates." Id. at 248-50. MCFL thus modestly broadened Buckley's definition of express
advocacy, while still concentrating on the presence of words of electoral advocacy in the
message.
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have recently voiced concern about the growing gap between campaign
finance doctrine and campaign finance practices, particularly soft money
and issue advocacy. 118
In light of the empirical evidence of the electioneering nature of most
contemporary issue advocacy 119 and of the cooperation between parties and
candidates in conducting issue advocacy campaigns, 12 a law that treats
communications regarding clearly identified candidates in a precisely and
reasonably defined pre-election period ought to pass constitutional muster.
The constitutionality of BCRA's application of the ban on corporate and
union expenditures to tax-exempt organizations that engage in certain
targeted electioneering communications-the Wellstone Amendment'21-is
a different story. The general definition of electioneering communications
applies only to FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements. 22 Its aim is
to assure disclosure of the funding sources of ads concerning candidates in
the pre-election period. It does not limit the ability of any individual or
group to actually spend money to place such ads. The rules governing
corporations and unions, however, are far more restrictive. They ban the
use of corporate and union treasury funds for independent expenditures that
would promote or oppose federal election candidates.' 23 As previously
noted, the Supreme Court held in MCFL that such restrictions cannot be
constitutionally applied to entities which, although they are corporate in
form, do not engage in business activities or receive funds from business
corporations, and do not have shareholders. 124 The Wellstone Amendment
would appear to reach communications that-though they may be subject to
reporting and disclosure requirements-are constitutionally exempt from
restriction. The Amendment might be sustained if interpreted in light of
MCFL to apply only to tax-exempt organizations that do not use corporate
118. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399, 404-05 (2000) (Breyer &
Ginsburg, JJ., concurring) (suggesting the need to "reinterpret aspects of Buckley in light of the
post-Buckley experience" and suggesting that if Buckley is not so open to reinterpretation that
"the Constitution would require us to reconsider Buckley"); id. at 405-10 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing Buckley for giving rise to soft money and issue advocacy).
119. See, e.g., Magleby, supra note 78, at 11; HOLMAN & McLOUGHLIN, supra note 23, at

66.
120. See, e.g., Magleby, supra note 78, at 8.
121. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 204, 116 Stat. 81
(2002) (amending section 316(c) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as added by
section 203, to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(6)).
122. Id. § 201(a) (amending section 304 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended by section 103, to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)).
123. Id. § 203 (amending section 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, to be
codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)-441c).
124. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986).
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or union funds to support their election-related activities, although it is not
clear what that adds to BCRA's general provision extending FECA's ban on
corporate and labor campaign expenditures to electioneering
communications.
Otherwise, the Wellstone Amendment is probably
unconstitutional.
D.

Conclusion

With the exception of the Wellstone Amendment, the key components of
BCRA dealing with soft money and issue advocacy ought to be sustained.
This is not to say that they are clearly constitutional or will be upheld by the
three-judge court prior to Supreme Court review. BCRA's provisions push
out existing doctrines and require the courts to think anew about such issues
as the relationships linking parties, party officials, officeholders and
candidates, and the distinction between election-related communications
and other political speech. Particularly in the issue advocacy context,
BCRA goes beyond the existing case law. But the statute is plainly
consistent with the fundamental tenets of Buckley and its progeny-that
contributions that threaten to create quid pro quos between donors and
officeholders, and thereby impugn the integrity of the political process, may
be prohibited; that corporate and union treasury funds may be excluded
from federal elections; that funds used in connection with federal election
activities may be subject to disclosure; and that the scope of federal
campaign finance regulation should be based on a clear and reasonably
limited definition of election-related activity. BCRA does not challenge
Buckley. Rather, the new law simply updates the part of FECA upheld by
Buckley to account for the role of political party soft money that emerged
since 1980, while modifying Buckley's definition of election-related speech
in light of the reality of contemporary campaign practices.
III.

BCRA AND THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

Judicial review is not the only threat to BCRA. Less than three months
after BCRA became law, and at a time when the many lawsuits challenging
the statute had not even been briefed let alone resolved, the FEC adopted a
set of rules interpreting the soft money provisions of the Act that many
observers, including the Act's sponsors, believe erode important elements
of the new law.
First, the Commission eased some of the limitations on fundraising for
soft money by federal officeholders and candidates. BCRA states that a
federal candidate or officeholder may not "solicit, receive, direct, transfer,
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or spend funds in connection with an election for federal office" unless
those funds are subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting
requirements of federal law. 125 To flesh out the meanings of "solicit" and
"direct," the FEC's staff had proposed defining the term to include "a
request, suggestion or recommendation to make a contribution"' 116 inorder
to reach subtle or indirect fundraising efforts. The Commission, however,
127
rejected that approach and defined "solicit" as simply meaning "to ask'
and defined "to direct" as "to ask a person who has expressed an intention
to make a contribution" that he or she do so. 128 According to critics, such
narrow definitions will exempt solicitations and directions that by a wink
and a nod indicate where funds should be given or sent without an express
request. 129 In addition, the Commission expanded the statutory provision
allowing federal candidates and officeholders to appear at state and local
party fundraising events by permitting them to "speak at such events
without restriction or regulation."' 130 Critics fear this will enable federal
officers and candidates to resume soft money fundraising at state party
events. 131
Second, the Commission apparently gave the green light to the national
party committees to create and spinoff new entities up until the soft money
ban's effective date on November 6, 2002. If, after the effective date, those
party spinoffs kept their distance from the parties, they could raise and
spend soft money notwithstanding the parties' "actions
and activities" with
32
respect to those entities before the effective date.'
Third, the FEC created several exceptions to the rules governing state
and local parties. The Commission narrowly defined the state and local
party "get-out-the-vote activity" subject to the soft money ban as direct
voter assistance, such as "[o]ffering to transport or actually transporting
125. § 101(a) (adding new section 323(e) to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, to
be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)).
126. Federal Election Commission, Prohibited and Excessive Contributions; Non-Federal
Funds or Soft Money, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,654, 35,660 (May 20,
2002).
127. See 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(m) (2002).
128. See § 300.2(n).
129. See, e.g., Stop Opening Loopholes, supra note 14, at A18.
130. 11 C.F.R. § 300.64 (2002).
131. See Stop Opening Loopholes, supra note 14, at A18 (expressing fear that FEC action
"potentially opens up a loophole, one in which solicitations can be made elliptical[l]y enough to
be outside the law yet clearly enough to convey the request to a potential donor"); see also
Election Law Coup d'Etat,supra note 14, at A 18.
132. 11 C.F.R. 300.2(c)(3) (2002); Thomas B. Edsall, New Routes to Channel 'Soft Money'
on Horizon: FECPuts Exemption in FinanceRules, WASH. POST, June 23, 2002, at A7 (quoting
view of dissenting FEC Commissioner Scott E. Thomas that the groups benefited by the FEC
rule will be "vehicles" for the party national committees).
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voters to the polls."' 33 This definition may exclude from the soft money
ban other party activities designed to mobilize voters but that fall short of
providing direct assistance to voting. So, too, the Commission created an
exemption from the soft money ban for the communications of any
"association or similar group of candidates for State or local office or of
individuals holding State or local office" to identify voters and encourage
34
them to vote if the communications refer only to state or local candidates.'
Such state-level associations could use unlimited soft money on voter
mobilization provided the voter mobilization literature refers only to state
and local candidates. Candidates for federal office who are running in the
same election and appear on the same ballot would benefit from the
activities of their party's fellow candidates down the ticket-and from the
donations to those state and local candidate or officeholder "associations."
Indeed, party officials have speculated that groups of state officials, such as
the Association of State Democratic Chairs, may "become a major soft
money vehicle."'' 35 The Commission also exempted state and local
parties-and associations of state and local candidates or officeholdersfrom having to report their receipts and expenditures for federal election
activity if those receipts and disbursements come to less than $5000 per
calendar year-in 36effect, carving out an exception that Congress had
declined to create.'
The FEC rules undercut each of the three central components of BCRA's
soft money ban: the restrictions on federal officeholder and candidate
fundraising, the ban on national party soft money, and the controls on the
ability of state parties to channel into federal elections funds not subject to
the constraints of federal campaign finance law. At this early date, it is
difficult to assess just how much they undermine the Act's ability to control
soft money. However, Commissioner Michael E. Toner, who supported the
regulations, called the rule relaxing the statutory prohibition on federal
officeholder or candidate fundraising at state and local party events "a total
carve out" from BCRA, 137 and the Washington Post concluded that, as a
result of the FEC's soft money regulations, "top officials can be more
involved in raising soft money, and soft money can be used for more
purposes"'138 in direct contravention of Congress's intent in passing the
statute in the first place.
133. 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(3) (2002).
134. See id. § 100.24(a)(3)(4).
135. Edsall, supra note 132, at A7.

136. 11 C.F.R § 300.36(b)(1) (2002).
137. Thomas B. Edsall, FEC to Allow 'Soft Money' Exceptions; Campaign Finance Law's
Sponsors Criticize Panel,WASH. POST, June 21, 2002, at Al.
138. Stop Opening Loopholes, supra note 14, at Al8.
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BCRA's principal sponsors-Senators McCain and Feingold, and
Representatives Shays and Meehan-have indicated they may challenge the
FEC's soft money regulations, either by seeking a congressional resolution
under the Congressional Review Act to overturn the rules, or by a lawsuit
under the Administrative Procedure Act.' 39 It is unclear whether either
approach will succeed.
Even if the significance of the particular FEC regulations narrowing the
soft money ban has been overstated, the FEC's action is a reminder of just
how much BCRA's effectiveness is dependent on vigorous administrative
oversight of political practices and enforcement of BCRA's requirements
and prohibitions by the FEC. Yet, the FEC's soft money rule-making
reveals the agency to be indifferent, if not downright hostile, to the mission
assigned to it by Congress. Much as FEC rules initially gave rise to soft
money, the FEC's most recent regulations and the agency's attitude toward
soft money reform may create a new opportunity for soft money to survive
even under BCRA.
IV.

THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AGENDA AFTER

BCRA

BCRA closely follows the main lines of campaign finance regulation set
out in FECA and FECA Amendments of 1974-disclosure of contributions
and expenditures; limitations on the dollar amount of contributions to
candidates, PACs and parties, and by PACs and parties to candidates; and
continuation of earlier prohibitions on campaign contributions and
expenditures by business corporations and labor unions. BCRA essentially
plugs many of the holes that emerged in FECA's structure over time, as the
combination of FEC and court decisions and campaign finance
innovations-principally soft money and issue advocacy-eroded FECA's
requirements and prohibitions. Assuming that it stands up in court and is
not gutted by the FEC, BCRA does no more than bring soft money and
issue advocacy under regulation. It restores the campaign finance status
quo ante of campaign finance regulation as of the early 1980s. That is an
important accomplishment-and a necessary component of a campaign
finance reform program-but it is not enough to constitute true campaign
finance reform. At least two further, fundamental matters need to be
addressed; the administrative structure for enforcing campaign finance law,
and the provision of new resources to candidates to increase electoral
competitiveness.
139. Sponsors of Election Reform Law Plan Action to Overturn FEC Rule, 71 U.S.L.W.
2010, 2010-11, July 2, 2002.
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A.

Administrative Reform

The FEC has long been subject to criticism from journalists,
academics, public-interest groups, and election[] lawy[ers] ....It
has been called a "toothless tiger" and a "wobbly watchdog" that
has "neither the will nor the means to deter wanton violators ......
[T]he FEC catches few election law violations; fails to penalize
most of those it catches; and imposes penalties that are so small,
and come so long after the40 election, that they do not have a
meaningful deterrent effect.1

As many observers have noted, the FEC's problems result from a

"combination of structural, political, and legal factors."' 14 1 As one recent,
highly critical study of the Commission concluded, "[t]he FEC was

structured to be ineffective."' 142 The Commission is composed of six
members, appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, who serve for six-year terms. 143 No more than three Commissioners
may be affiliated with any one political party. 144 In practice, this has meant
that the Commission is composed of three Democrats and three
Republicans. Moreover, despite the provision for presidential appointment,
in practice the Commissioners are picked by the congressional party
leaders.

45

They are usually "chosen on the basis of their political

commitment to effective
allegiances rather than their qualifications 14and
6
administration and enforcement of the law."'

As an even-numbered body, the Commission is highly unusual among
federal agencies. With four affirmative votes required by law for action, and
140.

DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY: A BLUEPRINT FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

75 (2000)

[hereinafter DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY].
141. Id.
142. Project FEC, No Bark, No Bite, No Point: The Casefor Closing the FederalElection
Commission and Establishing a New System for Enforcing the Nation's Campaign Finance
Laws 7 (2002), at http://www.democracy21.org/vertical/Sites/{ 3D66FAFE-2697-446F-BB39(last visited
85FBBBA57812}/uploads/{B4BE5C24-65EA-4910-974C-759644EC0901}.pdf
Dec. 4, 2002).
143. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1), (2)(A) (2000).
144. Id. § 437c(a)(1) (2000).
145. ProjectFEC,supra note 142, at 20.
146. Project FEC, supra note 142, at 15. Congressional leadership control over the
selection of FEC Commissioners is particularly ironic in light of the fact that, in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme Court invalidated, as violative of the separation of
powers, the provision of FECA Amendments of 1974 that gave the leaders of Congress power
to appoint four of the six voting members of the FEC. See 424 U.S. at 109-43. Although the
Court ruled that, due to the FEC's broad rule-making and law enforcement powers, the
President must be able to appoint all members of the FEC (subject to Senate confirmation),
today the President may have less actual power over the composition of the FEC than he would
have if the 1974 provision had remained law.
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the body evenly divided between Republicans and Democrats, the
Commission is often deadlocked and unable to act in politically charged
cases. 47 In other cases, the members from both parties may act together to
block proceedings hostile to the interests of the parties. 4 8 Moreover,
"[a]lso departing from the usual practice among federal agencies,'' 149 the
Commission lacks a strong chair. This "may hamper the ability of the
Commission to focus its resources; set investigative, enforcement, or policy
priorities; and establish an effective and visible public presence that would
0
encourage compliance with legal requirements."1
Beyond the problems growing out of its six-member structure and its
politicized appointments process, the FEC is hobbled by a cumbersome,
multi-step enforcement process that values conciliation over vigorous action
to prevent and penalize violations of the law,151 a lack of resources, 152 and
congressional retaliation when the agency actually seeks to carry out its
mandate.' 5 3 Early in its life, the FEC conducted random audits of the
financial reports of House and Senate candidates. 154 When those audits
turned up "minor but embarrassing inaccuracies in the reports of many
incumbents,"' 55 Congress stripped the Commission of the authority to
56
undertake random audits.1

The structure and procedures for the administration and enforcement of
campaign finance laws are profoundly difficult questions. We need an
agency capable of taking vigorous and decisive action-of acting in "real
time" to prevent campaign finance violations during the election in which
they are occurring and of punishing and deterring lawbreakers. Yet, we
also need an agency that is fair, not controlled by one party or officeholder,
and subject to constraints that prevent it from abusing its mandate and
intervening in elections-and potentially displacing the democratic
process-when such intervention is not warranted. Moreover, the election
finance agency is charged with the delicate task of regulating the very
elected officials who have the authority to appoint and confirm its members,
control its budget, and determine its legal powers. Elected officials are
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

ProjectFEC,supra note 142, at 8-11.
Id. at 11-13.
DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 140, at 77.
Id.
Id. at 79-82.
Id. at 77-78.
153. See ProjectFEC,supra note 142, at 71-80.
154. See id. at 72-73.
155. BROOKS JACKSON, BROKEN PROMISE: WHY THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

FAILED 12 (1990).
156. See Project FEC,supra note 142, at 73.
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aware of just how crucial agency determinations can be for their electoral
futures. Thus, vigorous activity can result in a loss of legal authority and
fiscal resources. Some measures are needed to make the agency at least
partially independent of the political process; yet the agency, like all other
arms of government, must ultimately be accountable to the political process.
It is far from certain how the FEC can be restructured and how an agency
can be created that is independent, impartial, vigorous, yet also politically
accountable and constrained. Recent studies have included proposals: to
expand the Commission by adding a nonpartisan member;' 5 7 to limit the
membership to retirement-age federal judges; 158 or to replace the
159
Commission with a single administrator who would serve for a long term.
Studies have sought to increase the agency's investigative powers, enhance
and expedite its enforcement process, and, with greater difficulty, assure
that it is provided the funds it needs to carry out its enforcement
responsibilities. 160
The precise nature of a reformed campaign finance administration and
enforcement mechanism is beyond the scope of this article. But it is clear
that, with the passage of BCRA, restructuring or replacing the FEC needs to
be high on the campaign finance reform agenda. The enactment of BCRA
was driven largely by a concern over soft money. Yet, the legal foundation
for soft money was laid by the FEC, 16 1 much as the FEC in its recent rulemaking has struggled to preserve a place for soft money in the federal
electoral system. The FEC's part in the soft money saga is symptomatic of
the profound problems that mark the agency. Successfully addressing the
soft money problem-indeed, successfully enforcing the current campaign
finance laws, let alone successful enforcement of any new laws-will
require sustained attention to the structure and procedures of the campaign
finance enforcement agency.
B.

More Resources, Competitive Elections, and Public Funding

The central strand in federal campaign finance law, from the Tillman Act
of 1907 through the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, FECA, and
BCRA has been, as the Supreme Court indicated in Buckley, the prevention
of corruption and the appearance of corruption by checking-whether
157. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 140, at 151.
158. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR

CAMPAIGN FINANCE 129 (2002).
159. Project FEC,supra note 142, at 35-38.
160. Id. at 43-44; DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 140, at 156-58.
161. See Project FEC,supra note 142, at 81-95.
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through disclosure, constraints on certain donors, or dollar limitations-the
role of large campaign contributions and the danger those contributions
pose of making candidates and officeholders "too compliant with the wishes
of large contributors."'' 62 The protection of government integrity and public
confidence in government through controls on the corrupting danger posed
by large campaign contributions is an important goal. But it is incomplete.
The political process suffers as much from inadequate campaign resources,
and unevenly distributed resources, as it does from the role of large donors.
Although so much of campaign finance reform has been focused on
limiting and controlling the flow of campaign money, it needs to be
recognized that money is essential for modem election campaigns. "Money
buys all the things crucial for a modem election campaign-broadcast and
radio air time; the printing and mailing of campaign literature;
transportation costs; . . . the rent for campaign offices; the costs of dataprocessing equipment and computer time," and the services of campaign
professionals.1 6 Money is what enables the candidate to campaign, that is,
to present information concerning his or her views, policies and experiences
to the voters. Conversely, from the perspective of the voters, campaign
spending pays for most of the information they will receive concerning the
candidates. Adequate funding is thus essential for effective campaigning
and informed voters. The central failing of our privately financed campaign
system is that it does nothing to assure that candidates are adequately
funded. Candidates who can raise large sums of money-or are personally
wealthy and willing to devote their own resources to the campaign-can be
well-funded. Other candidates will be inadequately funded.
This is particularly a problem for challengers. Incumbents typically start
out better known and benefit from media coverage of their activities in
office.164 Moreover, many donors contribute primarily to assure that they
have access to officeholders, and, thus, give more heavily to incumbents
who are, by definition, already in office. By contrast, "[t]he majority of
House challengers now raise and spend so little that they cannot wage a
viable campaign."' 165 In the 1998 elections, when the average House
incumbent spent $657,000, nearly half of all House challengers raised
$100,000 and only one-third raised as much as $200,000. 166 "As a result,
162. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (relying on Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976)).
163. DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 140, at 84.
164. Research and Policy Committee, Committee for Economic Development, Investing in
the People's Business: A Business Proposal for Campaign Finance Reform 17 (1999), at
http://www.ced.org/docs/report/report-cfr.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2002).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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most House elections were financially uncompetitive."' 167 Indeed, "60
percent of House incumbents either had no significant opposition or
outspent their opponents by a margin of 10-to-i or more."' 68 These
financially noncompetitive races are usually politically noncompetitive, too.
The House challengers who spent less than $200,000 on average received
under 40% of the two-party vote. 169 On the other hand, those House
challengers who were able to raise and spend as much as the average
incumbent managed to run competitive races and received a significantly
0
higher percentage of the vote than their under-funded counterparts.17
The central roles of PACs and large individual donations "contribute to
the fiscal edge of incumbency."' 7' Corporate and trade association PACs,
in particular, give overwhelmingly to incumbents, as do individuals who
make large contributions.' 72 The preferences of these donors, who tend to
pursue financing strategies aimed at assuring access to the likely winners,
reflect and reinforce, the benefits of incumbency. Federal campaign finance
law did not produce this system, but it also does little to offset it. As one
distinguished political scientist has noted, "the campaign finance system
offers challengers
no weapons with which to overcome the advantages of
'' 73
incumbency.
Democracy does not require frequent turnover in office or the regular
ouster of incumbents by challengers. What it does require is that voters
have a real opportunity to consider alternatives to the incumbent and that
incumbents know there is a real possibility they may lose. Democracy,
thus, turns on the emergence of challengers who can compete effectively
with incumbents. As Joseph Schumpeter once put it, "electorates normally
do not control their political leaders in any way except by refusing to reelect
them . .,,17'
Effective challengers, in turn, require adequate financingsomething our privately financed system too frequently fails to deliver.
Moreover, the current campaign finance system requires that candidates
and officeholders devote enormous amounts of time, effort and money to
fundraising. There is anecdotal evidence that the burdens of fundraising
have contributed to the decisions of some officials to decline to seek
reelection and of some potential candidates not to challenge incumbents,

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.

171. DOLLARS & DEMOCRACY, supra note 140, at 68.

172. See id. at 69-71.
173. FRANK J. SORAUF, INSIDE CAMPAIGN FINANCE: MYTHS AND REALITIES 178 (1992).
174. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 272 (3d ed. 1950).
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thereby impairing the competitiveness of elections. 175 Professor Vincent
Blasi has argued that the burdens of fundraising undermine the quality of
political representation, as elected officeholders are distracted from
1 76
constituent service or policy-making by the need to solicit donations.
Our burdensome fundraising system can also skew campaign activity,
forcing candidates to spend more time meeting with potential contributors
than formulating positions or meeting with voters.
Some form of congressional public funding system will be necessary to
attain the democratic goal of more competitive House and Senate elections,
to reduce the burdens of fundraising, and to enable congressional candidates
to fund their campaigns without excessive dependence on large donors or
undue reliance on their own personal fortunes. Indeed, BCRA may very
well increase the need for a public system, since by curtailing soft money,
the new law is likely to make it more difficult for candidates to raise money.
Although the soft money curbs are partially offset by increases in the hard
money limits, 177 the overall effect of the law is likely to reduce the flow of
money to candidates. Moreover, BCRA particularly targets fundraising and
spending by the political parties, and the parties, of all the playersindividual donors, PACs, and parties-in the campaign finance system,
have been the most financially supportive of competitive challengers.' 178
So, although the case for public funding to provide new resources and aid
challengers was strong even before the enactment of BCRA, the new statute
will increase the need for congressional public funding still further.
BCRA will also require Congress to give new attention to the
presidential public funding system. Presidential public funding provides
qualifying candidates with matching funds in the primary election periodwith $250 from each donor matched dollar-for-dollar until a federal ceiling
is reached. 179 Major party nominees receive a large flat grant, adjusted for
inflation from a 1974 base; nominees of minor parties are eligible for
BCRA, probably unintentionally, weakened the
smaller grants.1 80
presidential public funding program particularly in the primary phase. As
noted, the tradeoff for the new soft money restrictions was the approval of
increases in the hard money limits. Thus, an individual may now give a
175. See DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supranote 140, at 60.

176. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising: Why
Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the FirstAmendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1281, 1282-83 (1994).
177. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307, 116 Stat. 81
(2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), (a)(3), (h)).
178. See DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supranote 140, at 73.
179. 26 U.S.C. § 9034 (2000).
180. 26 U.S.C. § 9004 (2000).
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primary candidate a $2000 donation. The law, however, did not increase
the amount of private donation eligible for a public match or the public
matching ratio or the spending ceiling. As a result, private funding is now a
far more attractive alternative to the public grant than it was before
BCRA-particularly for the major candidates likely to do well in garnering
private contributions. In 1999-2000, George W. Bush was the first major
party contender since the public funding law was enacted in 1974 to
participate successfully in the presidential primaries without public
funding.18 1 Having raised $100 million in hard money donations at a time
when he was not yet the incumbent and the hard money donation limit was
just $1000, President Bush should easily be able to double that in 2004 to
$200 million running as the incumbent with a $2000 hard money limit.
That is nearly three times the maximum amount of public money likely to
be available to his Democratic opponent in the general election in 2004.
The growing gap between the hard money limit and public funding may
drive many of the leading Democratic contenders out of the public funding
system, too. 182
Congress needs to fix the presidential public funding system in response
to BCRA. Either more private dollars need to be matchable, or, better still,
the present 1-to-i match needs to be replaced by a 2-to-i or greater
multiplier. The maximum public grant and spending ceiling need to be
raised above the number produced by the 1974 formula. That number was
too low when adopted and campaign costs have risen far faster than the rate
of inflation. And public
funding needs a more secure fiscal base than the
83
tax return checkoff. 1
But more is needed than simply repairing the presidential public funding
system. The next item on the campaign finance reform agenda must be
some form of congressional public funding.
As with FEC reform, this is not the place to layout a specific proposal.
Numerous plans have been put forward in recent years, including public
grants to candidates based on a generous match for small private
contributions;1 84 "clean money" programs similar to those adopted in a
number of states that make a flat grant of public funds to qualifying
candidates; 185 the use of public funds to give vouchers to voters who would
181. See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
563, 584 (1999). In 1996, Steve Forbes participated in the Republican presidential primaries
without public funding, as he did again in 2000, but he did not prevail in either election. Id.
182. See Thomas B. Edsall, Privatized Primaries?Some Leading Democrats May Eschew
Public Fundingin '04, WASH. POST, July 10, 2002, at A6.
183. See Briffault, supra note 181, at 586-87.
184. See DOLLARS AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 140, at 99-118.
185. See Briffault, supra note 181, at 567-68 & nn.14, 15.
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contribute them to candidates of their choosing; l8 6 a requirement that the
owners of radio and television stations provide candidates with free
broadcast time during campaigns; 187 and tax credits for small individual
contributions. Each of these proposals has different characteristics,
strengths and weaknesses. But each would tend to level the playing field
for challengers, provide candidates with additional campaign resources, and
reduce the burdens of fundraising without the corruption dangers posed by
large private contributions.
With the enactment of BCRA-and assuming BCRA stands up in court
and withstands administrative trimming by the FEC-public funding is the
central need in campaign finance reform. BCRA, if it survives, does the
important work of restoring FECA and the longstanding federal disclosure
requirements and limits on large donations and corporate and union
warchests. But campaign finance ultimately requires more money, not less,
and, especially, money that in practice is as available to challengers as it is
to incumbents. Campaign finance reform based solely on disclosure and
limits cannot do that. Nor can a campaign finance system that relies
entirely on private donations. The next goal for campaign finance reform
must be not simply the prevention of corruption but the promotion of
competition. That will require a new commitment of public resources to the
funding of federal election campaigns.

186. See ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 158, at 12-24, 66-92.
187. See Alliance for Better Campaigns, The Case for Free Air Time (2002), at
http://freeairtime.org/reports/display.php?ReportlD=10 (last visited Dec. 4, 2002). The free air

time program is not technically a public funding program but the provision of free air time
would greatly reduce the costs of some campaigns and assure broadcast opportunities for
challengers, and, thus, would have some of the beneficial effects of public funding. Id.

